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In late June, 2013 the international anti-corruption community literally exploded when 
the Chinese government announced that it had found evidence that the UK pharmaceu-
tical giant GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK) was involved in bribery and corruption of Chi-
nese doctors. We are not just talking about nickel and dime stuff but over $500 million 
in illegal payments were alleged to have been made by the company’s China business 
unit over a several year period. But the thing that made this matter stand out for the 
anti-corruption compliance community was how public the allegations, company 
statement and counter-statements were. Never had we seen such a spectacle played out 
in the international press.  
 
For those not familiar with the allegations, they were well-reported in the international 
press. Kathrin Hille and John Aglionby 1  reported that “China has accused Glax-
oSmithKline of being at the centre of a “huge” scheme to raise drug prices in three of the 
country’s biggest cities and said the UK-based drugmaker’s staff had confessed to brib-
ing government officials and doctors. China’s Ministry of Public Security said a probe in 
Changsha, Shanghai and Zhengzhou found that GSK had tried to generate sales and 
raise drug prices by bribing government officials, pharmaceutical industry associations 
and foundations, hospitals and doctors.” They reported that some of the techniques 
used included the issuance of “fake VAT receipts and used travel agents to issue fake 
documents to gain cash, according to the ministry. Some executives had also taken ad-
vantage of their positions to take kickbacks from organising conferences and projects.” 
Further, “There are many suspects, the illegal behaviour continued over a long time and 
its scale is huge,” the ministry said.”  
 
Laurie Burkitt and Chris Matthews2 reported on a televised interview of Liang Hong, 
the GSK China Vice President and Operations Manager, where he “described for view-
ers of China Central Television how staffers would allegedly organize conferences that 
never happened and divert the money to bribe government officials, hospitals and med-
ical personnel to get them to use Glaxo's products.” He was quoted as saying, “Dealing 
with some government departments requires some money that couldn't be claimed 
normally under company expenses.” Burkitt and Matthews said that “The broadcast 
follows detailed allegations by China's Ministry of Public Security on Monday accusing 
Glaxo of using travel agencies as vehicles to bribe hospitals, officials and medical person-
!
!!
1  Kathrin Hille & John Aglionby, China accuses GlaxoSmithKline of bribing officials over prices, Financial Times 
(Jul. 11, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cc61926e-e9f3-11e2-b2f4-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cT52tZKR. 
2  Laurie Burkitt & Christopher M. Matthews, China Steps Up Pressure on Glaxo, Wall Street Journal (Jul. 16, 
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nel to sell more drugs at inflated prices. Officials also alleged the travel agencies offered 
what the officials called sexual bribes to Glaxo executives to keep company business.” 
 
These findings flew in the face of the company’s own internal investigation into allega-
tions of bribery and corruption brought by a whistleblower. Hille and Aglionby report-
ed that “GSK said it had conducted an internal four-month investigation after a tip-off 
that staff had bribed doctors to issue prescriptions for its drugs. The internal inquiry 
found no evidence of wrongdoing, it said.” Indeed after the release of information from 
the Chinese government, which GSK said was the first it had heard of the investigation, 
it released a statement quoted in the FT article, which stated ““We continuously moni-
tor our businesses to ensure they meet our strict compliance procedures – we have done 
this in China and found no evidence of bribery or corruption of doctors or government 
officials. However, if evidence of such activity is provided we will act swiftly on it,” the 
company said.” 
 
In another FT article, Hook and Jack entitled “GSK is test case in China’s rules laborato-
ry”, noted that GSK had received information from an internal whistleblower back in 
January. The company investigated claims of bribery and corruption and publicly an-
nounced that the company had found no such evidence of “bribery or corruption in 
relation to our sales and marketing…in China”. Further, the company claimed it was 
unaware of any allegations of bribery of doctors to prescribe its drugs until there was a 
public announcement by China’s Public Security Ministry. 
 
The bad news continued to be reported in the international press through July and up 
until early August, 2013 when the Chinese government ceased making its almost daily 
announcements about the matter and GSK had relatively little to say about the case for 
the remainder of the year. But in mid-2014, more information began to come out re-
garding more specific allegations of GSK’s misconduct in China, allegations about cor-
ruption issues in other countries and the anonymous whistleblower and internal inves-
tigation. All of this culminated in a secret one-day trial in August, 2014 where GSK was 
convicted of corruption in China and receiving a (Chinese) record fine of approximately 
$491MM. 
 
This article will bring the GSK corruption scandal up to date, detail the facts, infor-
mation and allegations that continued to dribble out over the past year and end with the 
GSK conviction for corruption. I will also present some of the lessons which a compli-
ance practitioner may take away from this matter to use in the review, implementation 
and enhancement of a best practices compliance program going forward. We pick up the 
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GSK Prosecution Timeline  (2014)  
 
May UK Serious Fraud Office and U.S. Department of Justice announce 
they have opened separate investigations against GSK. 
 
May Chinese authorities accuse GSK China Country Manager Mark Reilly 
of orchestrating China bribery scheme. 
 
June Allegations of GSK bribery in Syria, Iraq, Poland and Greece surface. 
GSK China unit employees bring claims that were forced by man-
agement to pay bribes and told to lie to investigators. 
 
July It is revealed that GSK was sent a ‘sex tape’ of China country manager 
and his girlfriend by same anonymous whistleblower who made alle-
gations of bribery. 
 
July Trial of Humphreys and wife is announced. 
 
August 8 One-day trial held for Humphreys and wife. Both convicted. 
 
September 18 GSK pleads guilty in secret one-day trial. Fined $491MM. 
 
 
II. GSK FACES A BAD DAY AT BLACK ROCK 
 
You know it is going to be a rainy day when your employees line up to testify against 
your company in an ongoing investigation for bribery and corruption. But those rainy 
day sighs can move up to a Bad Day at Black Rock level when these same employees 
publicly announce that the company they work for owes them for the creation of 
fraudulent invoices used by a business unit to fund bribery and corruption which vio-
lates not only the FCPA and the UK Bribery Act but also domestic Chinese anti-
corruption laws. This happened to GSK when it was announced that certain current 
employees in its China operation were petitioning the company to reimburse them for 
bribes they were ordered to pay by their superiors.   
 
It was reported3 “the UK pharmaceutical company at the centre of a Chinese corruption 
!
!!
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scandal, is facing protests from junior employees who say the company is refusing to 
reimburse them for bribes they were ordered to pay by their superiors.” While my initial 
thought was that these Chinese employees had quite a bit of ‘cheek’ in raising this claim. 
Moreover, “some Chinese sales staff are complaining that GSK has denied bonuses, 
threatened dismissal or refused to reimburse them for bribes they say were sanctioned by 
their superiors to boost the company’s drug sales. In some cases, managers instructed 
them to purchase fake receipts that were used to cover up bribes paid in cash or gifts to 
doctors and hospitals, according to salesmen interviewed by the Financial Times.”  
 
The article went on to highlight just how some of these fake invoices, used to gain funds 
from the corporate headquarters to facilitate bribery and corruption, were generated. 
“In some instances, managers disguised their involvement by using their personal email 
address to instruct staff to pay bribes and by ordering junior staff to claim on their per-
sonal expense accounts – even if the bribe was actually paid out by the manager – ac-
cording to these people.” Last March, a group of current GSK employees sent a letter to 
the company that said, in part, ““All the expenses were approved by the company,” the 
group wrote in a letter to management. “The expenses were paid with our own money, 
and although the receipts were not compliant, it was our managers who told us to buy 
the fake receipts,” said one former GSK salesman.” 
 
The article quoted that GSK said, “We have zero tolerance for unethical or illegal behav-
iour and anyone who conducts such behaviour has no place in our company. We believe 
the vast majority of our employees uphold our values and we welcome employees speak-
ing up if they have concerns.” Talk about a ‘Speak Up’ culture. Probably not exactly 
what GSK had in mind when it invited employees to raise their concerns.  
 
However, as damning as this is, and it would certainly appear to be quite damning, was 
the following revelation, regarding witness prep during GSK’s internal investigation. 
The article noted, “Some staff were warned not to implicate their supervisors, according 
to a former salesman: “Our manager approached each person before they were ques-
tioned and asked them not to mention his name. He even prepared a story for them to 
tell the investigator.”” 
 
Dissecting all of the above, it would appear that GSK has several real problems on sever-
al fronts. The first is that there appears to have been clear China business unit manage-
ment participation in the bribery and corruption scheme. While it is still not clear 
whether the corporate home office was involved in the scheme, simply knew of it or 
choose to bury its collective head in the sand as to what was going on in China, if your 
in-country business unit management is involved, it is not too many steps to the corpo-
rate home office. Conversely, the question might be that if this fraud against the corpo-
rate home office was so open and obvious, why did the corporate office not detect it 
going forward?  
 
Yet the real issue for the corporate office may be the information about employees being 
!
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coached to hide evidence during the investigation. If such activity was limited to the 
‘managers’ in the Chinese business units only, what does it say about a corporate office, 
which allows such witness intimidation? Think that is an investigation best practice? 
However, if the corporate office was involved in any way in such witness intimidation, it 
will bode extremely poorly in the eyes of the regulators, the UK SFO, which has opened 
an investigation into the GSK matter and probably the DOJ as well, since GSK is still 
subject to the Corporate Integrity Agreement it signed back in July of 2012; when it pled 
guilty and paid $3 billion to resolve fraud allegations. Think witness tampering or hiding 
of evidence might garner the attention of the DOJ for a company already under the 
equivalent of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA)? 
III. THE SEX TAPE 
 
Rebecca Evans4 reported “A covert sex tape involving a senior executive and his Chinese 
lover was the trigger for a major investigation into corruption at British drugs giant 
GlaxoSmith-Kline, it was revealed yesterday. The video of married Mark Reilly and his 
girlfriend was filmed by secret camera and emailed anonymously to board members of 
the pharmaceutical firm. It led to an investigation that has rocked the £76billion com-
pany – which stands accused of bribing doctors and other health officials in China with 
£320million of gifts, including sexual favours from prostitutes, to persuade them to 
prescribe its drugs.” 
 
This sex tape, along with allegations of bribery and corruption, were sent to GSK Board 
members, including CEO Sir Andrew Witty in March 2013 by someone with the email 
address “GSK Whistleblower”. Evans reported that two additional emails “making seri-
ous fraud allegations” were sent as well, one in January and one in May. Laurie Burkitt5 
reported that “The British drug maker regarded the video—apparently shot without the 
executive's knowledge—as a breach of security, the person said.” Evans reported that in 
addition to this security breach, GSK believed the sex tape to be a “threat or blackmail 
attempt”.  
 
One of GSK’s responses was to hire the firm ChinaWhys Co., to investigate the matter. 
The firm’s principals, former journalist Peter Humphrey and Yu Yingzeng, a naturalized 
US citizen, were not able to determine who placed the video camera in Reilly’s Shanghai 
!
!!
4  Rebecca Evans, How a secret sex tape plunged British drugs giant Glaxo in a £90million bribery probe, MailOnline 
(Jun. 30, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2673963/How-secret-sex-tape-plunged-British-
drugs-giant-Glaxo-90million-bribery-probe.html. 
5  Laurie Burkitt, Sex Video of GlaxoSmithKline China Executive Led to Hiring of Private Sleuths, Wall Street Jour-
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apartment, who shot the video or who sent it to GSK executives. However Evans re-
ported “But a few months after starting to investigate Miss Shi, Mr Humphrey was 
arrested along with his wife Yu Yingzeng, a US citizen and daughter of one of China’s 
most eminent atomic weapons scientists. According to Evans, Mr Humphrey’s arrest 
and detention in July was at around the same time that China began a police probe into 
GSK’s alleged bribery. And, unfortunately for Humphrey and his wife, they were ar-
rested last August for allegedly breaking of Chinese laws relating to information privacy.  
 
In addition to the investigation into the provenance of the sex tape and its sender, GSK 
had also engaged in an internal investigation into the substantive allegations of bribery 
brought forward by the “GSK Whistleblower” in emails to the GSK Board in January 
and May, 2013. As reported by Evans, “The emails laid out a series of sales and marketing 
practices described as ‘pervasive corruption’.” Unfortunately for the company, GSK 
“found ‘no specific evidence’ to substantiate the claims. However, the accusations are 
virtually identical to the charges laid by police against Mr Reilly and 45 other suspects. 
Britain’s Serious Fraud Office announced it would investigate the company’s ‘commer-
cial practices’.” 
 
‘Honey-pots’ and ‘Sparrow-nests’ are well known terms for anyone who has read cold 
war tales of espionage between the former Soviet Union and the US. However, the Reil-
ly sex-tape and the GSK bribery scandal would seem to be an entirely different can of 
worms. Hannah Beech6 wrote that in China, “Surveillance - or the threat of surveillance 
— is a constant in China. As a journalist, I may be more interesting to the powers that 
be than some other foreigners here. But other expat friends who’ve been followed, 
hacked or otherwise tracked in China include diplomats, NGO staff and businesspeople. 
Also, artists and academics.” Such surveillance includes having “email auto-forwarding 
mysteriously activated or to be tailed by a black Audi while on assignment in the Chi-
nese countryside.” 
 
It does seem incredible at this point that any serious internal investigation could fail to 
turn up any of the evidence that the Chinese government has been able to develop 
against GSK. This points to the absolute importance of your internal investigations. 
Although the GSK investigation was focused in China, the same is true in the US, par-
ticularly for a US listed company subject to Dodd-Frank. Further, we must invoke that 
well-known British author George Orwell for reminding you that in some countries Big 
Brother really is watching you. And finally, you may not be paranoid as people really 
may be watching you and filming your most intimate acts.  
!
!!
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IV.  INTERNATIONAL RIPPLES FROM THE CHINESE CORRUPTION INVES-
TIGATIONS 
 
The effects of the GSK bribery scandal have expanded far beyond the geographic limits 
of China. Lucy Hornby7 wrote about some of the ripple effects of the GSK corruption 
investigation. Her basic thesis was set out in the first line of her piece, “Never before 
have China’s domestic politics had such ramifications for global business.” She wrote 
about two tangible examples of what she termed the “ripple effects” of the Chinese anti-
corruption investigation, which began in earnest last summer with the revelations of 
corruption by GSK.  
 
Hornby reported that the stock price for the Canadian company, Athabasca Oil Corpo-
ration, “the partner company for major Chinese investments in Canadian oil sands – fell 
13 per cent this week. It is down 24 per cent since the beginning of April, when Athabas-
ca announced PetroChina, a listed unit of CNPC, would buy the 40 per cent of the 
Dover oil sands project that it did not already own. Since then, two executives from 
PetroChina’s Canadian operations have fallen prey to the corruption purge – and the 
C$1.32bn (US$1.23bn) transfer payment has not been made.” But these ripples have also 
reached the British breakfast table as Chinese authorities announced they were investi-
gating the owner of the company that makes the breakfast staple Weetabix.  
 
Business ventures in other countries such as Cambodia and Australia have been put off 
due to the Chinese corruption investigation. This has been because of both corrupt 
payments made to Chinese officials and in some cases corrupt payments alleged to have 
been made by Chinese officials. For instance in Cambodia a project that was mired in 
such problems that the primary funding partner, The World Bank, had suspended 
funding has now run into such problems that Standard Chartered may lose up to 
$250MM in funding which it provided. Further, Hornby reported that “In Australia 
last year, a A$1.4bn bid for Sundance Resources – which had proposed a $A5bn iron ore 
mine on the border of Cameroon and the Republic of Congo – collapsed after high-
flying Chinese entrepreneur Liu Han abruptly vanished. Mr Liu had built his mining 
business by cultivating ties with Mr Zhou while the latter governed southwestern Si-
chuan province. He was sentenced to death in May for organised crime. His defence was 
that he was carrying out orders for unnamed “leaders”.” 
 
Things are particularly difficult at PetroChina, a major investor in Canadian oil sands, 
because, as Hornby noted, “dozens of senior executives have been detained or ques-
tioned in the past year. Many, including the head of its Indonesian business, played key 
!
!!
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roles in its international projects.” However Hornby believes that “capital expenditure 
commitments by state-owned enterprises are likely to be honoured as the investigation 
continues, because China's large and growing economy has a fundamental need for re-
sources.” 
 
Another large Chinese energy concern CNPC has also been hard hit by the corruption 
scandal. Attached, as a diagram, to Hornby’s article is a graphic that shows the extent of 
the company’s investments of the past 10 years or so. The graphic also notes that the 
company “has been hardest hit by the ongoing corruption purge, with dozens of senior 
executives detained or questioned.” The chart below shows the “ripple effects” of 
CNPC investment. 
 











Hornby’s article touched on another area, which has significance for the FCPA practi-
tioner,  that begs the question of whether a state-owned enterprise is an instrumentality 
or in any other way covered by the FCPA? She wrote that “the unusually public nature 
of this corruption investigation has given outsiders a clearer insight into the way money 
and power have become entwined, and influence dealmaking, in today's China.” She 
quoted Luke Patey, for the following, ““For years, Chinese national oil companies have 
fought hard against the label that they are political instruments of the Chinese govern-
ment and Communist party. That political nature is now on full display.”” 
 
Hornby’s article demonstrates not only the pervasive nature of Chinese corruption but 
also how many countries such corruption may have effected. It also dispels those FCPA 
naysayers who argue that the law brings a competitive disadvantage to US companies. 
Many of these Chinese investments are now on hold with no hope of completion or 
even funding because of the domestic turmoil inside China over corruption. Companies 
and countries want a reliable business partner, starting with one which does not engage 
in bribery and corruption to obtain a contract and then onto a company which fulfills 
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V.  HUMPHREY AND WIFE CONVICTED 
!
When it was announced in July, 2014 that Peter William Humphrey, a 58-year-old Brit-
ish national, and his wife, Yu Yingzeng, a 61-year-old American, would go on trial on 
charges of illegally purchasing personal information about Chinese nationals would go 
on trial, on August 8, 2014, Shanghai’s No. 1 Intermediate People's Court, the trial was 
originally scheduled to be closed to the public.  However later in July, Chinese officials 
announced that the trial would be ‘open’ although the degree of openness is not com-
pletely clear.  
 
Further the couple’s son, Harvey Humphrey, was allowed visited his parents in their 
detention center in Pudong, Shanghai, for the first time since their arrest. The visit came 
after some fierce lobbying by the US and UK consulates. Carly Heflan8 reported that 
their son said, “They didn't quite believe I was coming. They were quite overwhelmed. 
My mum was shocked. My dad held himself together,” the younger Humphrey told the 
paper. “It's a bit unusual for the Chinese to do this. I feel something has changed in the 
Chinese approach to my parents.” Son Harvey had written to the GSK’s Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) Sir Andrew Witte last December to “take a few minutes to raise my fa-
ther's case” during a visit to the country, he told the FT, “I understand everything is 
complicated in China but it seems my parents are paying a big price”. 
 
In that one-day trial Peter Humphreys and his wife Ms. Yu, were convicted of illegally 
purchasing information on Chinese citizens. Gabriel Wildau and Andrew Ward9 report-
ed that husband Humphreys received a two and a half year jail term which was “just 
short of the three-year maximum”. James T. Areddy and Laurie Burkitt10 reported that 
he was also ordered to pay a fine of approximately $32,500 and will be deported from 
the country when his jail term is completed. Wife Yingzeng received a two year jail term 
and was ordered to pay a fine of approximately $23,000 but will be allowed to remain in 
the country after her sentence is completed. Both announced after the trial that they 




8  Carly Helfand, GSK private eyes' son allowed first visit to parents in China jail as trial nears, FiercePharma (Aug. 4, 
2014), http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/gsk-private-eyes-son-allowed-first-visit-parents-china-jail-
trial-nears/2014-08-04. 
9  Gabriel Wildau & Andrew Ward,  China court sentences GSK investigator, Financial Times (Aug. 8, 2014), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/af4b76dc-1ecb-11e4-ad93-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cT52tZKR. 
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David Barboza11 reported that the couple “acknowledged that from 2009 to 2013, they 
obtained about 250 pieces of private information about individuals, including govern-
ment-issued identity documents, entry and exit travel records and mobile phone records, 
all apparently in violation of China’s privacy laws.” According to the NYT article, wife 
Yu claimed that she did not know her actions where illegal and was quoted as saying, 
“We did not know obtaining these pieces of information was illegal in China. If I had 
known I would have destroyed the evidence.” According to the WSJ, the privacy law 
which was the basis of the conviction, was enacted in 2009 “to make it illegal to handle 
certain personal medical records and telephone records” but that the law itself “remains 
vague” on what precisely might constitute violation.  
 
From the court statements, however, it did appear that the couple had trafficked in per-
sonal information. As reported by the WSJ, “In separate responses over more than 10 
hours, Mr. Humphreys and Ms. Yu denied that their firm trafficked in personal infor-
mation, saying they had hired others to obtain personal data when clients requested it.” 
From the documents presented by the prosecution, it would seem clear that the couple 
had obtained my items which were more personal in nature. They were alleged by pros-
ecutors to have “used hidden cameras to gather information as well as government rec-
ords on identification numbers, family members, real-estate holdings, vehicle owner, 
telephone logs and travel records.” 
 
Recognizing the verdicts under Chinese laws are usually predetermined and the entire 
trials are scripted affairs, there is, nonetheless, important information communicated to 
the outside world by this trial. First and foremost is, as reported in the NYT article is a 
“chilling effect on companies that engage in due diligence work for global companies, 
many of whom believe the couple may have been unfairly targeted.” The WSJ article 
went further quoting Geoffrey Sant for the following, “It impacts all attempts to do 
business between the U.S. and China because it will be very challenging to verify the 
accuracy of company or personal financial information.” In other words, things just got 
a lot tougher to perform, what most companies would expect to be a minimum level of 
due diligence.  
 
Second is the time frame noted in the court statements as to the time of the violations, 
from 2009 to 2013. Many had assumed that Humphreys and Yingzeng’s arrests related 
to their investigation work on behalf of the GSK, which was trying to determine who 
had filmed a sex tape of the company’s head of Chinese operations, which was then 
provided to the company via an anonymous whistleblower. This would seem to beg the 
question of whether the couple would have been prosecuted if they not engaged in or 
!
!!
11  David Barboza, In China, British Investigator Hired by Glaxo, and Wife, Sentenced to Prison, The New York Times 
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accepted the GSK assignment.  
VI.  GSK CONVICTED 
 
“GSK plc sincerely apologises to the Chinese patients,  
doctors and hospitals, and the  
Chinese Government and the Chinese people.” 
 
With those words, GSK was convicted in a secret trial in a court in the Hunan province 
of China for bribery and corruption related to its Chinese business unit. The amount of 
the fine was approximately $491MM. This fine was the largest levied on a western com-
pany for bribery and corruption in China. Moreover, if it had been in the United States 
for a violation of the FCPA, it would have come in as the third highest fine of all-time, 
behind those of Siemens and Halliburton. Andrew Ward and Patti Waldmeir12 noted 
that the fine is “equal to the Rmb 3bn in bribers that Chinese investigators said had been 
paid by GSK.”  
 
While it is not entirely clear how long the trial lasted, it appeared that it was in the same 
range as the one-day trial given to Peter Humphrey and his wife last month, when they 
were both found guilty for violating China’s privacy laws. Keith Bradsher and Chris 
Buckley13 reported, “Chinese authorities accused Glaxo of bribing hospitals and doctors, 
channeling illicit kickbacks through travel agencies and pharmaceutical industry associa-
tions — a scheme that brought the company higher drug prices and illegal revenue of 
more than $150 million. In a rare move, authorities also prosecuted the foreign-born 
executive who ran Glaxo’s Chinese unit.” Moreover, GSK China’s country manager, 
Mark Reilly and four other in-country executives were each convicted with potential 
sentences of up to four years in prison. The NYT noted, “the sentences were suspended, 
allowing the defendants to avoid incarceration if they stay out of trouble, according to 
Xinhua. The verdict indicated that Mr. Reilly could be promptly deported. The report 
said they had pleaded guilty and would not appeal.” 
 




12  Andrew Ward & Patti Waldmeir, GSK to pay £297m fine for Chinese bribes, Financial Times (Sept. 19, 2014), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dea9811e-3fd5-11e4-936b-00144feabdc0.html. 
13  Keith Bradsher & Chris Buckley, China Fines GlaxoSmithKline Nearly $500 Million in Bribery Case, New York 
Times (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/business/international/gsk-china-
fines.html. 
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• Mark Reilly: GSK’s former China chief. He was sentenced to prison for three 
years with a four-year suspension. He was also the victim of an illicit recording 
of he and his girlfriend with the sex tape delivered to GSK management in 
London. 
• Zhang Guowei: GSK China’s former HR Director, who was sentenced to three 
years in prison with a three-year suspension. Chinese state media said he admit-
ted that the company has used many bribery schemes to ensure the sales of high 
price drugs to Chinese consumers. 
• Liang Hong: Former GSK China’s vice president and operations manager. He 
was sentenced to two years in prison with a three-year suspension. On Chinese 
state-controlled television he said he gave bribes to government officials, hospi-
tal administrators and doctors via travel agencies to pave the way for drug sales. 
• Zhao Hongyan: GSK China’s former legal-affairs director. Ms. Zhao was sen-
tenced to two years in prison with a two-year suspension. On state-controlled 
television Ms. Zhao said she destroyed evidence relating to bribery to avoid 
punishment. 
• Huang Hong: Huang was a GSK China’s business-development manager. She 
was sentenced three years in prison with a four-year suspension. The WSJ arti-
cle reported that she was accused of giving and taking bribes; and informed 
Chinese officials that GSK China used funds labeled for public relations uses to 
maintain relationships with “major clients,” who she said were hospital admin-
istrators. 
 
The suspension of the sentences was highly significant. The FT article quoted from the 
trial court that the sentences had resulted directly because “they confessed the facts 
truthfully and were considered to have given themselves up.” The WSJ article reported 
that the court also took into account that GSK China country manager Mark Reilly had 
“voluntarily returned to China, assisted in the investigation and confessed…and had 
“truthfully recounted the crimes of his employer.” Also they were in stark contrast to 
the three-year and two-year sentences handed down to Humphreys and his wife respec-
tively last month. There was no word from GSK, however, on whether it would termi-
nate some or all of the convicted executives. 
 
GSK itself made several interesting statements about the bribery allegations and conclu-
sions of the trial court. The FT article quoted CEO Sir Andrew Witty, for the following, 
“Reaching a conclusion in the investigation of our Chinese Business is important, but 
this has been a deeply disappointing matter for GSK. We have and will continue to learn 
from this. GSK has been in China for close to a hundred years, and we remain fully 
committed to the country and its people.” The company went further in statements. In 
addition to the quote above, GSK was quoted in the NYT article as saying, “that it ‘fully 
accepts the facts and evidence of the investigation, and the verdict of the Chinese judicial 
authorities.’” The FT article added further clarification when it said that GSK “had ‘co-
operated fully with the authorities and has taken steps to comprehensively rectify the 
!
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issues identified at the operations of GSK China.’” 
 
These statements of contrition are quite a distance from the place where GSK started 
last summer when the bribery allegations broke when the company tried to use the 
‘rogue employee(s)’ defense, when it said that the bribery and corruption involved only 
a “few rogue Chinese-born employees” that were “outside our systems of controls” 
Oops.  
 
The NYT reported that GSK also said, “that the court, the Changsha Intermediate Peo-
ple’s Court, had found the company guilty only of bribing nongovernmental person-
nel.” This is significant because the bribery of a government official (defined as such in 
China and not under the FCPA) is a much more serious crime in China. The British 
Embassy in China also weighed in, at least slightly, with the following statement, “We 
note the verdict in this case. We have continually called for a just conclusion in the case 
in accordance with Chinese law. It would be wrong to comment while the case remains 
open to appeal.” 
VII.  THE VERDICT 
!
Did GSK obtain a negotiated settlement with the Chinese government when it was 
announced that the company pled guilty to bribery and corruption and was fined al-
most $500MM by a Chinese court? Further, what lessons can be drawn from the GSK 
matter for companies operating in China and the compliance practitioner going for-
ward?  
 
The first lesson to draw is that the Chinese government will focus more on companies 
than on individuals. Andrew Ward, Patti Waldmeir and Caroline Binham15 quoted Mak 
Yuen Teen, a corporate governance expert at the National University of Singapore for 
the following, “By handing suspended sentences rather than jail terms to Mark Reilly, 
GSK’s former head of China, and four of his top lieutenants, the court in Hunan prov-
ince was holding the company more accountable than the individuals.”  
 
However other commentators said, “GSK got off more lightly than expected for bribing 
doctors to prescribe its drugs.” The article went on to note, “People close to the situa-
tion denied that the outcome amounted to a negotiated settlement. But Bing Shaowen, 
a Chinese pharmaceuticals analyst, said it was likely that GSK made commitments on 
research and development investment and drug pricing to avoid more draconian treat-
!
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ment. Andrew Ward, Patti Waldmeir and Caroline Binham16 cited Dan Roules, an anti-
corruption expert at the Shanghai firm Squire Sanders, who said that he had expected 
the penalty to be harsher. Roules was quoted as saying “The fact that GSK co-operated 
with the authorities would have made a difference.” The article went on to say that 
Roules “pointed to GSK’s statement on Friday pledging to become “a model for reform 
in China’s healthcare industry” by “supporting China’s scientific development” and 
increasing access to its products “through pricing flexibility”.” 
 
What about reputational damage leading to a drop in the value of stock? The market 
had an interesting take on the GSK conviction, it yawned. Moreover, as noted in the FT 
Lex Column “The stock market was never bothered. The shares moved little when the 
investigation, and then the fine, were disclosed.” Why did the market have such a reac-
tion? The Lex Column said that one of the reasons might be that the “China may be too 
small to matter much for now” to the company.  
 
Another lesson is one that Matt Kelly17 wrote about in the context of US National 
Football League scandals around criminal actions of football players, when he said that a 
company must align its “core values with its core priorities.” GSK moved towards doing 
that throughout the last year, during the investigation into the bribery and corruption 
scandal in China. Although CEO, Sir Andrew Witty, has been a champion for ethical 
reform in both the company and greater pharmaceutical industry, the FT  reporters 
noted that the China corruption scandal, coupled with “smaller-scale corruption allega-
tions in the Middle East and Poland, has raised fresh questions about ethical standards 
and compliance.” If Witty wants to move GSK forward, he must strive to align the 
company's business priorities with his (and the company’s) stated ethical values.  
 
Which brings us to some of the successes that GSK has created in the wake of the brib-
ery and corruption scandal. These successes are instructive for the compliance practi-
tioner because they present concrete steps that the compliance practitioner can do to 
help facilitate such change. As reported by Katie Thomas18 one change that GSK has 
instituted is that it will no longer pay doctors to promote its products and will stop ty-
ing compensation of sales representatives to the number of prescriptions doctors write, 
which were two common pharmaceutical sales practices that have been criticized as 
troublesome conflicts of interest. While this practice has gone on for many, many years 
!
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16  Id. 
17  Matt Kelly, The NFL’s True Problem: Misplaced Priorities Trumping Ethics & Compliance, Compliance Week 
(Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/the-big-picture/the-nfl’s-true-problem-
misplaced-priorities-trumping-ethics-compliance#.VXWEfGDOVCM. 
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it had been prohibited in the United States through a pharmaceutical industry-imposed 
ethics code but is still used in other countries outside the US. 
 
In addition to this ban on paying doctors to speak favorably about its products at con-
ferences, GSK will also change its compensation structure so that it will no longer com-
pensate sales representatives based on the number of prescriptions that physicians write, 
a standard practice that some have said pushed pharmaceutical sales officials to inappro-
priately promote drugs to doctors. Now GSK pays its sales representatives based on their 
technical knowledge, the quality of service they provided to clients to improve patient 
care, and the company’s business performance.  
 
In addition to the obvious conflict of interest, which apparently is an industry wide 
conflict of interest because multiple companies have engaged in these tactics, there is also 
clearly the opportunity for abuse leading to allegations of illegal bribery and corruption. 
Indeed one of the key bribery schemes alleged to have been used by GSK in China was 
to pay doctors, hospital administrators and other government officials, bonuses based 
upon the amount of GSK pharmaceutical products, which they may have prescribed to 
patients. But with this new program in place, perhaps GSK may have “removed the 
incentive to do anything inappropriate.” 
 
This new compensation and marketing program by GSK demonstrates that companies 
can make substantive changes in compensation, which promote not only better compli-
ance but also promote better business relationships. A company spokesman interviewed 
the NYT piece noted that the changes GSK will make abroad had already been made in 
the US and because of these changes, “the experience in the United states had been posi-
tive and had improved relationships with doctors and medical institutions.” 
 
In addition to these changes in compensation and marketing, Ward/Waldmeir/Binham, 
reported that GSK announced it would strive to be “a model for reform in China’s 
healthcare industry” by “supporting China’s scientific development” and increasing 
access to its products “through pricing flexibility”. They further stated “Rival compa-
nies will now be watching nervously to see whether more enforcement action takes place 
in a sector where inducements for prescribing drugs have long been an important source 
of income for poorly paid Chinese medics,” which is probably not going to be a return 
the wild west of bribery and corruption that occurred over the past few years in China. 
Bing Shaowen was quoted as saying that the GSK matter “is a very historic case for the 
Chinese pharmaceutical industry. It means that strict compliance will become the rou-
tine and the previous drug marketing and sales methods must be abolished.” But the 
company still faces real work to rebuild its reputation in China. Moreover, it still faces 
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VIII.  WHAT CAN YOU DO WHEN RISKS CHANGE IN A THIRD PARTY RELA-
TIONSHIP 
!
James T. Areddy and Laurie Burkitt19 explored some of the problems brought about by 
the investigators convictions. They quoted Manuel Maisog, chief China representative 
for the law firm Hunton & Williams LLP, who summed up the problem regarding 
background due diligence investigations as “How can I do that in China?” Maisog went 
on to say, “The verdict created new uncertainties for doing business in China since the 
case hinged on the couple's admissions that they purchased personal information about 
Chinese citizens on behalf of clients. Companies in China may need to adjust how they 
assess future merger partners, supplier proposals or whether employees are involved in 
bribery.”  
 
What does this mean for a company which desired to engage in business in China, 
through some type of third party relationship, from a sales representative to distributor 
to a joint venture? What if you cannot get such information? How can you still have a 
best practices compliance program around third parties representatives if you cannot get 
information such as ultimate beneficial ownership? At a compliance conference event, I 
put that question to a Department of Justice representative. Paraphrasing his response, 
he said that companies still need to ask the question in a due diligence questionnaire or 
other format. What if a third party refuses to answer, citing some national law against 
disclosure? His response was that a company needs to very closely weigh the risk of do-
ing business with a party that refuses to identify its ownership.  
 
A company must know who it is doing business with, for a wide variety of reasons. The 
current situation in China and even the convictions of Humphrey and Yu do not 
change this basic premise. You can ask the question. If a party does not want to disclose 
its ownership, you should consider this in any business relationship going forward.  
 
The Humphrey and Yu conviction do not prevent you from asking the question about 
ownership. Their convictions mean that you may not be able to verify that information 
through what many people thought was publicly available information, at least publicly 
available in the west. I was struck by one line in the Areddy and Burkitt article, “It’s not 
just that the tactical business practices need to change; it’s the mind set” quoting again 
from Maisog. 
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• Business Justification and Business Sponsor;  
• Questionnaire to Third Party; 
• Due Diligence on Third Party; 
• Compliance Terms and Conditions, including payment terms; and  
• Management and Oversight of Third Parties After Contract Signing. 
 
The due diligence step is but one of these five. Further due diligence is performed in 
large part to verify the information that you receive back from a proposed third party. 
So what if you can longer use avenues previously open to you in markets such as China? 
Perhaps there are other ways to manage this issue. Areddy and Burkitt also interviewed 
Jerry Ling, a partner at Jones Day, for the following “companies will need to analyze 
Chinese accounting documents themselves and conduct more in-person interviews with 
anyone they want to know more about in China.”  
 
Ling’s point dovetails directly into the remarks from the DOJ representative. There is 
nothing about the Chinese law, or any other country’s law, which prevents you from 
asking some basic questions that are found in the Step 2 Questionnaire cited above. You 
can always ask who the owners of a company are, whether they are direct or beneficial. 
You can always ask if a company, its owners or its senior management have been in-
volved in any incidents involving bribery and corruption and you can always ask if the 
company has a Code of Conduct and/or compliance program and whether its owners or 
senior management are aware of the FCPA and have had training on it.  
 
Assuming the company will answer your questionnaire, the difficulty you may find 
yourself in now is verifying the information that you receive. In Ronald Reagan par-
lance, you may trust but you may not be able to verify it. Ling said in the WSJ article 
that “The challenge now for clients is that it’s hard to get good information.” 
 
However, due diligence is but one step in the management of any third party in a FCPA 
compliance program. Just as when risk goes up and you increase your management 
around that risk, the situation is similar in here. Putting it another way, if you cannot 
obtain private information such as personal identification numbers during the due dili-
gence process, you can put greater management around the other steps that you can 
take. Further, there has been nothing reported which would suggest that publicly filed 
corporate licenses or other information that might show ownership can no longer be 
accessed. Court records and public media searches also seem to still be available.  
 
But what if you simply cannot determine if the information you are provided regarding 
ownership is accurate or even truthful? You can still work to manage the relationship 
through your commercial terms by setting your commission or other pay rates at a rea-
sonable amount of scale. If you are dealing with a commissioned sales representative, 
you can probably manage this area of the relationship by setting the commission in the 
range of 5%. You can also manage the relationship by reviewing invoices to make sure 
there is an adequate description of the services provided so that they justify whatever 
!
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compensation the third party is entitled to receive under the contract. You may also 
want to schedule such a third party for an audit ahead of other parties to help ensure 
adherence to your compliance terms and conditions.  
 
There may be times when you cannot verify the true or ultimate beneficial owner of a 
third party. That does not have to be the end of the analysis. If that situation arises, you 
may want to see if there are other risk mitigation tools at your disposal. Put another way, 
if such a red flag arises, can it be cleared? Can it be managed? If your company is looking 
a major deal for multi-millions and your agent will receive a six or seven figure commis-
sion, the risk of not knowing with certainty may be too great because in such a case, an 
unknown owner could be a government official who has awarded the contract. But if 
your agent receives a considerably smaller commission and hence there is a considerably 
small amount of money to constitute a bribe, you may be able to manage that risk 
through a close and effective relationship management process.  
IX.  COMPLIANCE LESSONS LEARNED FROM GSK IN CHINA 
 
A.  Integrating Your Risk Assessment 
 
One of the things that a compliance program must have is the flexibility to respond to 
changing events on the ground. Just as the GSK corruption scandal in China brought 
attention to domestic prosecutions of corruption in China, these very public events 
should bring the attention of your compliance team. A compliance program needed to 
be nimble in order to respond to such events in far-flung places. Risks change and they 
must be evaluated on a regular basis or in response to new facts on the ground, such as 
those which are present in China.  
 
There may also be more than anti-corruption risk at play in any given situation. If a 
company only looks at one type of risk, such as anti-corruption, rather than others such 
as export control or anti-money laundering (AML) it can lead to the concept of what is 
called the “functional trap” of labeling and compartmentalizing risk. Robert Kaplan and 
Annette Mikes20 declare that good risk discussions must be integrative in order for risk 
interaction to be evaluated. If not, a business “can be derailed by a combination of small 
events that reinforce one another in unanticipated ways.” 
 
The authors posit that it is difficult for companies to accurately and adequately discuss 
risk for a variety of reasons. One of these reasons is the aforementioned silo effect which 
can lead to a lack of discussion by a wide group regarding a number of risks, for example 
!
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compliance risk; reputational risk; brand risk; credit risk; human resources risk are but a 
few of the types of risks mentioned in their article. The authors believe that one of the 
ways to knock down these silos when it comes to a more complete management of risk is 
to “anchor their discussions in strategic planning, one integrative process that most well-
run companies already have” in place. 
 
The authors cautioned that beyond simply introducing a systematic process for identify-
ing and mitigating key risks, companies should also employ a risk oversight structure. 
The authors discussed the experience of the Indian IT company, Infosys, which uses a 
dual structure. It consists of a central team that identifies general strategy risks and then 
establishes central policy, together with a specialized, decentralized functional team. 
This second team designs and monitors policies and controls in consultation with local 
business units. These decentralized teams have the authority and expertise to respond to 
changes in the company’s risk profile coupled with the nimbleness and agility of being 
in the field to deal with smaller issues before they become larger problems for the central 
team back in the corporate office. 
 
I believe that the current political turmoil in China provides an example of the diversity 
your compliance program and risk assessment must maintain. Just as it is important to 
perform due diligence on third party representatives, before execution of an appropriate 
contract, the real work is in managing the relationship. In risk management, you must 
identify and assess the risk but the real work begins in managing the risk. This is where 
the rubber meets the road.  
 
B. Board Oversight and Tone in the Middle 
 
What are some of the lessons to be learned from GSK in China regarding the role of a 
company’s Board of Directors and ‘tone in the middle’? While we have not heard from 
the GSK Board on this case, it has become clear that the GSK Board was aware of both 
the anonymous whistleblower allegations and the release of the tape of the GSK China 
Country Manager and his girlfriend. One of the lessons learned from the GSK scandal is 
that a Board must absolutely take a more active oversight role not only when specific 
allegations of bribery and corruption are brought forward but also when companies are 
operating in high risk environments. Clearly this will be a major task for incoming Board 
Chairman, Sir Philip Hamilton, who will join the Board this coming January and will 
become the Chairman, later in the year when a successor is found for his current posi-
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Eric Zwisler and Dean Yoost21 noted that as “Boards are ultimately responsible for risk 
oversight” any Board of a company with operations in China “needs to have a clear un-
derstanding of its duties and responsibilities under the FCPA and other international 
laws, such as the U.K. Bribery Act”. Why should China be on the radar of Boards? The 
authors reported, “20 percent of FCPA enforcement actions in the past five years have 
involved business conduct in China. The reputational and economic ramifications of 
misinterpreting these duties and responsibilities can have a long-lasting impact on the 
economic and reputation of the company.”  
 
The authors understand that corruption can be endemic in China. They wrote,  “Local 
organizations in China are exceedingly adept at appearing compliant while hiding unac-
ceptable business practices. The board should be aware that a well-crafted compliance 
program must be complemented with a thorough understanding of frontline business 
practices and constant auditing of actual practices, not just documentation.” Further, 
“the management cadence of monitoring and auditing should be visible to the board.” 
All of the foregoing would certainly apply to GSK and its China operations.  
 
Moreover, the FCPA Guidance22 makes clear that resources and their allocation are an 
important part of any best practices compliance program. So if that risk is perceived to be 
high in a country such as China, the Board should follow the prescription in the Guid-
ance, which states “the amount of resources devoted to compliance will depend on the 
company’s size, complexity, industry, geographical reach, and risks associated with the 
business. In assessing whether a company has reasonable internal controls, DOJ and 
SEC typically consider whether the company devoted adequate staffing and resources to 
the compliance program given the size, structure, and risk profile of the business.” 
 
To help achieve these goals, the authors suggested a list of questions that they believe 
every director should ask about a company’s business in China.  
 
• How is “tone at the top” established and communicated? 
• How are business practice risks assessed? 
• Are effective standards, policies and procedures in place to address these risks? 
• What procedures are in place to identify and mitigate fraud, theft, and corrup-
tion? 
• What local training is conducted on business practices and is it effective? 
!
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21  Eric V. Zwisler & Dean A. Yoost, Corruption in China and Elsewhere Demands Board Oversight, National 
Association of Corporate Directors Directorship (Jul. 23, 2013), 
https://www.nacdonline.org/Magazine/Article.cfm?ItemNumber=9642. 
22  Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice & the Enforcement Division oft he U.S. Securities 
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• Are incentives provided to promote the correct behaviors? 
• How is the detection of improper behavior monitored and audited? 
• How is the effectiveness of the compliance program reviewed and initiated? 
• If a problem is identified, how is an independent and thorough investigation 
assured? 
 
Third parties generally present the most risk under a FCPA compliance program and are 
believed (at least anecdotally) to comprise over 90 percent of reported FCPA cases, 
which subsequently involve the use of third-party intermediaries such as agents or con-
sultants. But this is broader than simply third party agents because any business oppor-
tunity in China will require some type of business relationship.  
 
One of the major failings of the GSK Board was that it apparently did not understand 
the actual business practices that the company was engaging in through its China busi-
ness unit. While $500MM may not have been a material monetary figure for the Board 
to consider; the payment of such an amount to any third party or group of third parties, 
such as Chinese travel agencies, should have been raised to the Board. All of this leads me 
to believe that the GSK Board was not sufficiently engaged. While one might think a 
company which had received a $3bn fine and was under a Corporate Integrity Agree-
ment for its marketing sins might have sufficient Board attention; perhaps legal market-
ing had greater Board scrutiny than doing business in compliance with the FCPA or UK 
Bribery Act. The Board certainly did not seem to understand the potential financial and 
reputational impact of a bribery and corruption matter arising in China. Perhaps they 
do now but, for the rest of us, I think the clear lesson to be learned is that a Board must 
increase oversight of its China operations from the anti-corruption perspective.  
 
GSK CEO Sir Andrew Witty has certainly tried to say all of the right things during the 
GSK imbroglio on China. But did that message really get down into to the troops at 
GSK China? Moreover, did that message even get to middle management, such as the 
GSK leadership in China? Apparently not so, one of the lessons learned is moving the 
Olympian Pronouncements of Sir Andrew down to lower levels on his company. Just 
how important is “Tone at the Top”? Conversely, what does it say to middle manage-
ment when upper management practices the age-old parental line of “Don’t do as I do; 
Do as I say”?  Kirk O. Hanson23 listed eight specific actions that top executives could 
engage in which demonstrate a company’s and their personnel’s commitment to ethics 




23  Kirk Hanson, Ethics and the Middle Manager: Creating "Tone in The Middle”, Santa Clara University, Markkula 
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• Top executives must themselves exhibit all the “tone at the top” behaviors, in-
cluding acting ethically, talking frequently about the organization's values and 
ethics, and supporting the organization's and individual employee's adherence 
to the values. 
• Top executives must explicitly ask middle managers what dilemmas arise in im-
plementing the ethical commitments of the organization in the work of that 
group. 
• Top executives must give general guidance about how values apply to those 
specific dilemmas. 
• Top executives must explicitly delegate resolution of those dilemmas to the 
middle managers. 
• Top executives must make it clear to middle managers that their ethical per-
formance is being watched as closely as their financial performance. 
• Top executives must make ethical competence and commitment of middle 
managers a part of their performance evaluation. 
• The organization must provide opportunities for middle managers to work 
with peers on resolving the hard cases. 
• Top executives must be available to the middle managers to dis-
cuss/coach/resolve the hardest cases. 
 
What about at the bottom, as in remember those China unit employees who claimed 
they were owed bonuses because their bosses had instructed them to pay bribes? Well if 
your management instructs you to pay bribes that is a very different problem. But if 
your company’s issue is how to move the message of compliance down to the bottom, 
Dawn Lomer24, wrote that that the unofficial message which a company sends to its 
employees “is just as powerful - if not more powerful - than any messages carried in the 
code of conduct.” Lomer suggested that a company use “unofficial channels” by which 
your company can convey and communicate its message regarding doing business in an 
ethical manner and “influence employee behavior across the board.” Her suggestions 
were: 
 
• Reward for Integrity - Lomer writes that the key is to reward employees for do-
ing business in an ethical manner and that such an action “sends a powerful 
message without saying a word.” 
• The three-second ethics rule - It is important that senior management not only 
consistently drives home the message of doing business ethically but they 
should communicate that message in a short, clear values statement. 
!
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• Environmental cues - Simply the idea that a company is providing oversight on 
doing business ethically can be enough to modify employee behavior. 
• Control the images - It is not all about winning but conducting business, as it 
should be done.  
• Align Messages - you should think about the totality of the messages that your 
company is sending out to its employees regarding doing business and make 
sure that all these messages are aligned in a way that makes clear your ethical 
corporate culture clear. 
 
The GSK case will be in the public eye for many months to come. Both the UK SFO 
and US authorities have open investigations into the company. Just as the five counter-
point singing or the rooftop symphonic dance scene to the song America demonstrates 
the best of that art form; you can draw lessons from GSK’s miss-steps in China now for 
implementing or enhancing your anti-corruption compliance program going forward 
now.  
 
C.  Internal Investigations 
 
One of the clear lessons from the GSK matter is that serious allegations of bribery and 
corruption require a serious corporate response. Not, as GSK did in their best Inspector 
Clouseau imitation, failing to find the nose on their face. I was particularly focused on 
GSK’s response to at least two separate reports from an anonymous whistleblower (bril-
liantly monikered as GSK Whistleblower) of allegations of bribery and corruption going 
on in the company’s China business unit. 
 
Further, and more nefariously, is GSK’s documented treatment of and history with 
internal whistleblowers. One can certainly remember GSK whistleblower Cheryl Eck-
ard. Graeme Wearden25 reported that Eckard was fired by the company “after repeated-
ly complaining to GSK’s management that some drugs made at Cidra were being pro-
duced in a non-sterile environment, that the factory’s water system was contaminated 
with micro-organisms, and that other medicines were being made in the wrong doses.” 
She later was awarded $96MM as her share of the settlement of a Federal Claims Act 
whistleblower lawsuit. Eckard was quoted as saying, “It’s difficult to survive this finan-
cially, emotionally, you lose all your friends, because all your friends are people you have 
at work. You really do have to understand that it’s a very difficult process but very well 
worth it.” So to think that GSK may simply have been SHOCKED, SHOCKED, that 
allegations of corruption were brought by an internal whistleblower may well be within 
!
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the realm of accurate. 
 
There would have seemed to have been plenty of evidence to let the company know that 
something askance was going on in its Chinese operations. The international press was 
certainly able to make that connection early on in the scandal. Kathrin Hille and John 
Aglionby26, reported “GSK said it had conducted an internal four-month investigation 
after a tip-off that staff had bribed doctors to issue prescriptions for its drugs. The in-
ternal inquiry found no evidence of wrongdoing, it said.” Indeed after the release of 
information from the Chinese government, GSK said it was the first it had heard of the 
investigation. In a prepared statement, quoted in the FT, GSK said ““We continuously 
monitor our businesses to ensure they meet our strict compliance procedures – we have 
done this in China and found no evidence of bribery or corruption of doctors or gov-
ernment officials.” However, if evidence of such activity is provided we will act swiftly 
on it.” 
 
Laurie Burkitt27 wrote that “Emails and documents reviewed by the Journal discuss a 
marketing strategy for Botox that targeted 48 doctors and planned to reward them with 
either a percentage of the cash value of the prescription or educational credits, based on 
the number of prescriptions the doctors made. The strategy was called “Vasily,” borrow-
ing its name from Vasily Zaytsev, the noted Russian sniper during World War II, ac-
cording to a 2013 PowerPoint presentation reviewed by the Journal.” Burkitt reported in 
her article that “A Glaxo spokesman has said the company probed the Vasily program 
and “[the] investigation has found that while the proposal didn't contain anything un-
toward, the program was never implemented.”” From my experience, if you have a brib-
ery scheme that has its own code name, even if you never implemented that scheme, it 
probably means that the propensity for such is pervasive throughout the system. 
 
I have often written about the need for a company to have an investigative protocol in 
place so that it is not making up its process in the face of a crisis. However the GSK mat-
ter does not appear to be that situation. It would not have mattered what investigation 
protocol that GSK followed, it would seem they were determined not to find any evi-
dence of bribery and corruption in their China business unit. So the situation is more 
likely that GSK should have brought in a competent investigation expert law firm to 




26  Hille & Aglionby, supra note 2. 
27  Laurie Burkitt, Chinese Officials Find Evidence GlaxoSmithKline Workers Bribed Doctors, Hospitals, Wall Street 
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James McGrath and David Hildebrandt28 discussed the use of specialized outside coun-
sel to lead an independent internal investigation as compliance and ethics best practices. 
This is based upon the US Sentencing Guidelines, under which a scoring system is uti-
lized to determine what a final sentence should be for a criminal act. Factors taken into 
account include the type of offense involved and the severity of the said offense, as well 
as the harm produced. Additional points are either added or subtracted for mitigating 
factors. One of the mitigating factors can be whether an organization had an effective 
compliance and ethics program. McGrath and Hildebrandt argue that a company must 
have a robust internal investigation.  
 
McGrath and Hildebrandt take this analysis a step further in urging that a company, 
when faced with an issue such as an alleged FCPA violation, should engage specialized 
counsel to perform the investigation. There were three reasons for this suggestion. The 
first is that the DOJ would look towards the independence and impartiality of such 
investigations as one of its factors in favor of declining or deferring enforcement. If in-
house counsel were heading up the investigation, the DOJ might well deem the investi-
gative results “less than trustworthy”.  
 
Matthew Goldstein and Barry Meier29 wrote about the need for independence from the 
company being investigated in an article the NYT about the General Motors (GM) 
internal investigation. They quoted William McLucas, a partner at WilmerHale, who 
said, “If you are a firm that is generating substantial fees from a prospective corporate 
client, you may be able to come in and do a bang-up inquiry. But the perception is al-
ways going to be there; maybe you pulled your punches because there is a business rela-
tionship.” This is because if “companies want credibility with prosecutors and investors, 
it is generally not wise to use their regular law firms for internal inquiries.” Another 
expert, Charles Elson, a professor of finance at the University of Delaware who specializ-
es in corporate governance, agreed adding, “I would not have done it because of the 
optics. Public perception can be affected by using regular outside counsel.”” 
 
Adam G. Safwat, a former deputy chief of the fraud section in the Justice Department, 
said that the key is “Prosecutors expect an internal investigation to be an honest assess-
ment of a company’s misdeeds or faults, “What you want to avoid is doing something 
that will make the prosecutor question the quality of integrity of the internal investiga-
tion.”” Also quoted was Internal Investigations Blog editor, Jim McGrath who said, “A 
shrewd law firm that gets out in front of scandal can use that to its advantage in negoti-
ating with authorities to lower penalties and sanctions. There is a great incentive to fer-
!
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28  McGrath & Hildebrandt, Risks and Rewards of an Independent Investigation, ACC Docket 29, no. 8 at 38  (Oct. 
2010). 
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ret out information so they can spin it.” 
 
D. Internal Controls, Auditing and Monitoring 
 
There are valuable lessons to be drawn from GSK’s miss-steps in China around internal 
controls, auditing and monitoring an anti-corruption compliance program. One of the 
questions that GSK will have to face during the next few years of bribery and corruption 
investigations is how an allegedly massive bribery and corruption scheme occurred in its 
Chinese operations? The numbers went upwards of $500MM, which coincidentally was 
the amount of the fine levied by the Chinese court on GSK. It is not as if the Chinese 
medical market was not well known for its propensity towards corruption, as prosecu-
tions of the FCPA are littered with the names of US companies which came to corrup-
tion grief in China. GSK itself seemed to be aware of the corruption risks in China. Ben 
Hirschler30 reported that the company had “more compliance officers in China than in 
any country bar the United States”. Further, the company conducted “up to 20 internal 
audits in China a year, including an extensive 4-month probe earlier in 2013.” GSK even 
had PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) as its outside auditor in China. Nevertheless, he 
noted, “GSK bosses were blindsided by police allegations of massive corruption involv-
ing travel agencies used to funnel bribes to doctors and officials.” 
 
1.  Internal Controls 
 
Where were the appropriate internal controls? You might think that a company as large 
as GSK and one that had gone through the ringer of a prior DOJ investigation resulting 
in charges for off-label marketing and an attendant Corporate Integrity Agreement 
might have such controls in place. It was not as if the types of bribery schemes in China 
were not well known. Jamil Anderlini and Tom Mitchell31 wrote about the ‘nuts and 
bolts’ of how bribery occurs in the health care industry in China. The authors quoted 
Shaun Rein, a Shanghai-based consultant for the following “This is a systemic problem 
and foreign pharmaceutical companies are in a conundrum. If they want to grow in 
China they have to give bribes. It’s not a choice because officials in health ministry, hos-
pital administrators and doctors demand it.” 
 
Their article discussed the two primary methods of paying bribes in China: the direct 
incentives and indirect incentives method. Anderlini and Mitchell reported, “The 2012 
annual reports of half a dozen listed Chinese pharmaceutical companies reveal the com-
!
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30  Ben Hirschler, How GlaxoSmithKline missed red flags in China, Reuters (Jul. 19, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/19/us-gsk-china-redflags-idUSBRE96I0L420130719. 
31  Jamil Anderlini & Tom Mitchell, Bribery built into the fabric of Chinese healthcare system,  Financial Times (Jul. 
24, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9b8979e2-f45f-11e2-a62e-00144feabdc0.html. 
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panies paid out enormous sums in “sales expenses”, including travel costs and fees for 
sales meetings, marketing “business development” and “other expenses”. Most of the 
largest expenses were “travel costs or meeting fees and the expenses of the companies’ 
sales teams were, in every case, several multiples of the net profits each company earned 
last year.””  
 
It would be reasonable to expect that internal controls over gifts would be designed to 
ensure that all gifts satisfy the required criteria, as defined and interpreted in Company 
policies. It should fall to a Compliance Officer to finalize and approve a definition of 
permissible and non-permissible gifts, travel and entertainment and internal controls 
will follow from such definition or criteria set by the company. These criteria would 
include the amount of the spend, localized down into increased risk such the higher risk 
recognized in China. Within this context, noted internal controls expert Henry Mixon 
has suggested the following specific controls. (1) Is the correct level of person approving 
the payment / reimbursement? (2) Are there specific controls (and signoffs) that the gift 
had proper business purpose? (3) Are the controls regarding gifts sufficiently preventa-
tive, rather than relying on detect controls? (4) If controls are not followed, is that fail-
ure detected?  
 
2.  Auditing 
 
Following Mixon’s point 4 above, what can or should be a company’s response if one 
country’s gifts, travel and entertainment expenses were kept ‘off the books’? This is 
where internal audit or outside auditors are critical. Hirschler quoted an un-named 
source for the following, ““You'd look at invoices and expenses, and it would all look 
legitimate,” said a senior executive at one top accountancy firm. The problem with 
fraud - if it is good fraud - is it is well hidden, and when there is collusion high up then it 
is very difficult to detect."” Jeremy Gordon, director of China Business Services was 
quoted as saying “There is a disconnect between the global decision makers and the guys 
running things on the ground. It's about initially identifying red flags and then search-
ing for specifics.” 
 
There are legitimate reasons to hold medical conferences, such as to make physicians 
aware of products and the latest advances in medicine, however, this legitimate purpose 
can easily be corrupted. Hirschler quoted Paul Gillis, author of the China Accounting 
Blog, for the following “Travel agencies are used like ATMs in China to distribute out 
illegal payments. Any company that does not have their internal audit department all 
over travel agency spending is negligent.” Based on this, GSK’s auditors should have 
looked more closely on marketing expenses and more particularly, the monies spent on 
travel agencies. Hirschler wrote, “They [un-named auditing experts] say that one red 
flag was the number of checks being written to travel agencies for sending doctors to 
medical conferences, although this may have been blurred by the fact that CME ac-
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Another issue for auditing is materiality. If GSK’s internal auditors had not been trained 
that there is no materiality standard under the FCPA, they may have simply skipped 
past a large number of payments made that were under a company’s governance proce-
dure for elevated review of expenses. Further, if more than one auditor was involved 
with more than one travel agency, they may not have been able to connect the dots re-
garding the totality of payments made to one travel agency. 
 
3.  Ongoing Monitoring 
 
A final lesson is monitoring. As Stephen Martin often says, many compliance practi-
tioners confuse auditing with monitoring. Monitoring is a commitment to reviewing 
and detecting compliance programs in real time and then reacting quickly to remediate 
them. A primary goal of monitoring is to identify and address gaps in your program on 
a regular and consistent basis. Auditing is a more limited review that targets a specific 
business component, region, or market sector during a particular timeframe in order to 
uncover and/or evaluate certain risks. 
 
Here I want to focus on two types of ongoing monitoring. The first is relationship mon-
itoring, performed through software products. Internal GSK emails showed the compa-
ny’s China sales staff were instructed by local managers to use their personal email ad-
dresses to discuss marketing strategies related to Botox. Such software imports and ana-
lyzes communications data, like email, IM, telephony and SMTP log files from systems 
such as Microsoft Exchange Servers and Lotus Notes. The software then leverages social 
network analysis and behavioral science algorithms to analyze this communications data. 
These interactions are used to uncover and display the networks that exist within com-
panies and between the employees of companies. Additionally, relationships between 
employees and external parties such as private webmail users, competitors and other 
parties can be uncovered. 
 
The second type of monitoring is transaction monitoring. Generally speaking, transac-
tion monitoring involves review of large amounts of data. The analysis can be compared 
against an established norm which is derived either against a businesses’ own standard or 
an accepted industry standard. If a payment, distribution or other financial payment 
made is outside an established norm, thus creating a red flag that can be tagged for fur-
ther investigation. 
 
GSK’s failure in these three areas now seems self-evident. However, the company’s foi-
bles can be useful for the compliance practitioner in assessing where their company 
might be in these same areas. Moreover, as within any anti-corruption enforcement 
action, you can bet your bottom dollar that the regulators will be assessing best practices 
going forward based upon some or all of GSK’s miss-steps going forward. 
!
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X.  WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN? CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT 
AGAINST CORRUPTION 
 
GSK may well be a watershed in the global fight against bribery and corruption. Behav-
ior and conduct, which was illegal under Chinese law but previously tolerated and even 
accepted by Chinese government officials, quickly became a quagmire that the company 
was caught in when charges of corruption were leveled against them last year. Many 
westerners were skeptical about the claims made against GSK and its head of China 
operations, Mark Reilly. That is one of the problems in paying bribes to government 
officials; it is always illegal under domestic law. David Pilling32 said “Multinationals are 
discovering that there is only one thing worse than operating in a country where corrup-
tion is rampant: operating in one where corruption was once rampant – but is no longer 
tolerated.” 
 
When it began, it was not it clear why China’s Communist Party Chief Xi Jinping began 
his anti-corruption push. Some speculated that it was an attack on western companies 
for more political reasons that economic reasons. Others took the opposite tack that the 
storm, which broke with the bribery and corruption investigation of GSK, was China’s 
attack on western companies to either hide or help fix problems endemic to the Chinese 
economic system. My take is that his campaign has a different purpose but incorporates 
both political and economic reasons. That purpose is that Xi has recognized something 
that the US government officials and most particularly the DOJ have been preaching for 
some time. That is, the insidiousness of corruption and its negative effects on an eco-
nomic system.  
 
Xi and China have realized that corruption is a drain on the Chinese economic system. 
Publications as diverse as the Brookings Institute to the WSJ have noted that one of the 
reasons for the anti-corruption campaign is to restore the Chinese public’s faith in the 
ruling Communist Party. Bob Ward33 said, “China’s anticorruption drive began in late 
2012 as a way to cleanse the ruling Communist Party and convince ordinary Chinese that 
the system isn’t rigged against them. Investigators are targeting some of China’s most 
powerful officials and disciplining tens of thousands of lower-echelon officials who 
party investigators contend got used to padding their salaries.” Cheng Li and Ryan 
McElveen, writing online for Brookings, in an article entitled “Debunking Misconcep-
tions About Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign”, wrote, “If there were ever any 
doubts that Xi could restore faith in a party that had lost trust among the Chinese pub-
lic, many of those doubts have been dispelled by the steady drumbeat of dismissals of 
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32  David Pilling, Why corruption is a messy business, Financial Times (Sept. 24, 2014, 5:13 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/598aa4dc-426d-11e4-9818-00144feabdc0.html. 
33  Bob Ward, The Risks in China’s Push to Root Out Wrong, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 6, 2014. 
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high-ranking officials since he took office.” 
 
But the economic reasons behind the anti-corruption campaign are equally important. 
One of the more interesting articulations came from one disgraced former Chinese gov-
ernment official, who was one of the earliest senior officials to be charged with corrup-
tion. James T. Areddy34 wrote about the trial of Liu Tienan, the “former head of the 
National Energy Administration and senior director in the National Development Re-
form Commission” who had been arrested in May 2013. His trial finally came around in 
September 2014. At his trial he made some rather extraordinary statements. Areddy 
wrote that “Liu testified that reducing official power is key to curbing corruption: “The 
major point, which is based on my own experience, is to give the market a great deal of 
power to make decisions.”” But Liu did not end there, “as he explained his view that 
China’s state bureaucracies are too powerful and entrepreneurs are too weak. “Approv-
als should be developed in a system, rather by an individual’s actions. This would help 
prevent abuse of power for personal self-interest.”” 
 
Whether or not Liu thought those statements up on himself, a smart defense lawyer 
suggested he make them to reduce his sentence, or the Chinese government told him to 
say it as his role in the well-known show trials of the Chinese justice system; it really does 
not matter. That is one of the most incredible statements I have ever heard of coming 
out of anything close to an official Chinese statement or proceeding. Think about it; 
first Liu is saying that the Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ of the market should be gov-
erning market decisions. Next, he speaks against the arbitrary nature in China for entre-
preneurs in giving approval about how businesses can expand and grow in China. This 
arbitrary process should be replaced with objective criteria. It is almost if Lui is channel-
ing his inner FCPA Professor when he speaks against artificial barriers to market entry. 
Finally, Liu attacks the small-mindedness of bureaucratic mentality in their use of power 
for self-interest. 
 
There have already been demonstrated economic benefits to China’s anti-corruption 
campaign. In September, Bloomberg reported that China’s fight against bribery and 
corruption could boost economic growth, generating an additional $70 billion for the 
budget, in summarizing economists' forecasts. An article in the online publication Posi-
tion and Promotions, reported that the bribery “could trigger a 0.1-0.5 percent increase 
in the world's second-biggest economy, equivalent to $70 billion dollars.” This crack-
down should also be welcomed by western companies, as “it could also benefit foreign 
companies operating on the Chinese market, who have experienced the negative effects 
of the omnipresent palm-greasing, according to Joerg Wuttke, president of European 
Chamber of Commerce in China.” He was further quoted as saying, “It takes the stress 
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away. You're not afraid that somebody gets an order because he found a better cham-
pagne or something like that. It's not Singapore yet, but it's a very positive develop-
ment”. 
 
As we close this phase of GSK’s saga, I think some time for reflection is appropriate. For 
the compliance practitioner there have been many specific lessons to be learned from 
GSK’s missteps. However I think the clearest lesson is that the only real hope that a 
company has into today’s world is an effective, best practices anti-corruption compli-
ance program. Whether it is designed to help a company comply with the FCPA, UK 
Bribery Act or other anti-corruption legislation, it really does not matter. It is the only, 
and I mean only, chance your company will have when an issue in some far-flung part of 
the world splashes your company’s name across the world’s press.  
 
But there may also be cause for celebration to those who have long preached against the 
evils of corruption, whether it is for economic reasons or for those who view the fight 
against anti-corruption as a part of the fight against terrorism. For if China is attacking 
domestic corruption, I believe that will lead other countries to do so as well. So while 
GSK may well suffer going forward, the fight against global bribery and corruption may 
just have moved a few feet forward.  
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